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Abstract
Who Owns the ‘First Rough Draft of History’? suggests the withdrawal of copyright
protection from hard-news journalism as a mechanism for “rescuing” the news from the
inexorable downward spiral in quality and diversity caused by excessive media
concentration. Although copyright represents just one of the factors contributing to the
“commodification” of news today, it is a significant factor, and one with a long, unsavory
relationship with censorship and monopoly.
The article asserts that newspapers’ quest for copyright protection was an early
step onto a slippery slope toward a property-based, rather than service-based ethos, and
that removing protection may mark a first and at least symbolic step back from the abyss.
It argues that copyright protection should be replaced by a highly circumscribed variant
of the misappropriation tort, coupled with authorial rights of attribution and integrity.
It is doubtful that any of these proposed changes would prompt the media
conglomerates to jettison otherwise profitable news operations, but, where they do, the
resultant spin-offs may be more strongly committed to quality journalism. Fine-tuning
the copyright law with respect to news might also restore among executives and working
journalists alike some sense of public service obligation. And diluting the industry’s
news-as-property attitude might even make a favorable impression on the increasingly
disillusioned audience.
Perhaps, someday, the public will come to own what former Washington Post
publisher Philip Graham called the “first rough draft of history.”
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The copyright system, though constitutional, is broken. It effectively and
perpetually protects nearly all material that anyone would want to cite or
use. That’s not what the framers envisioned, and it’s not in the public
interest.
Editorial, Free Mickey Mouse, Wash. Post A16 (Feb. 21, 2003).
19. What Defendants gain by appropriating Plaintiffs’ copyrighted
material diminishes the value of Plaintiffs’ newspapers, websites, and
their advertising opportunities. For example, Defendants are usurping the
funds that Plaintiffs are entitled to receive from licensing these articles
through their Permissions Desks, through their sale of reprints, and
otherwise. These articles are Plaintiffs’ stock in trade.
20. By copying Plaintiffs’ copyrighted articles verbatim and posting them
on a site other than Plaintiffs’ websites, Defendants are also diverting
readers that would otherwise read Plaintiffs’ newspapers and access
Plaintiffs’ websites. This usurps Plaintiffs’ circulation figures, which, in
turn, has damaged and will damage Plaintiffs’ ability to attract
advertisers.
Complaint at 11-12, L. A. Times & Wash. Post v. Free Republic,
No. 98-7840 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1998).

Although The Washington Post doubtless stands behind both of the quotations
above, one suspects it stands considerably further behind the first than the second. After
all, as Judge Kozinski has said, “The simple fact is that the written word is a commodity;
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information is a commodity; truth is a commodity; fiction is a commodity. There are no
clear-cut lines between them.” 1 This article is dedicated to the proposition that Judge
Kozinski is wrong… or rather should be wrong.
When the Federal Communications Commission calls “The Howard Stern Show”
news,2 when Fox News calls the phrase “fair and balanced” property, the time has come
to redraw those lines.3
As news has become a smaller and smaller part of the business of corporate media
enterprises,4 journalism has become a smaller and smaller part of “the news.”5
Journalism as public service is inexorably being replaced by “infotainment” as
commodity. Among other consequences, the public has lost what respect it may have had
for newspapers and broadcast news, which are now lumped together with talk radio and
reality television to become simply “the media.” And while highly specialized forms of
journalism can still find their niche markets, which some find independently
problematic,6 the audience for mass circulation newspapers and mass audience broadcast
journalism is in a steady decline.

1

Alex Kozinski, How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the Press, 3 Commun. L. & Policy 163,
172 (1998).
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In re Request of Infinity Broadcasting Operations Inc. for Declaratory Ruling, FCC Declaratory Ruling
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2003).
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Compl., Fox News Network, LLC v. Penguin Group (USA) Inc., No. 601514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 7,
2003) http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ip/foxpenguin80703cmp.pdf (accessed Nov. 13, 2003).
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Bill Kovach & Tom Rosenstiel, The Elements of Journalism 32 (Three Rivers Press 2001) [hereinafter,
Kovach & Rosenstiel].
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Ken Auletta, Backstory: Inside the Business of News xiv (Penguin Press 2003)(“[A]s media companies
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Copyright law is not to blame for the commercialization of news. Indeed, the
evidence suggests that commercialization stimulated a demand for copyright protection
where none had existed before. Copyright law protected newspapers from the mid-19th
Century, not to mention all of 20th Century broadcast news. Copyright law may well
have facilitated the growth of substantial news-oriented enterprises that could and did
invest substantial sums into news gathering, production and distribution. That said, the
time may have come to reconsider whether a copyright regime that supports the
conviction that news is just another commodity for sale best serves the public interest.
This article asserts that the newspapers’ quest for copyright protection was an
early step onto a slippery slope toward a property-based, rather than service-based ethos,
and removing protection may mark a first and at least symbolic step back from the abyss.
Extending copyright protection to newspapers was always unnecessary and probably
unwise, even when qualified by the so-called fact/expression dichotomy and first sale and
fair use doctrines. Today, even these inadequate safeguards of the public domain are
being threatened by legally sanctioned access restrictions and rights management
regimes. Worldwide, copyright protection for journalism is far less rigorous than in the
U.S., and there may be some lessons to learn from abroad.
Copyright protection for journalism should be replaced by a highly circumscribed
variant of the much-criticized misappropriation tort, coupled with authorial rights of
attribution and integrity that supersede the American work-made-for-hire doctrine.
Transformative uses of journalism work product, i.e., new products in the same market,
or the same product in different markets, should be encouraged – the better to serve the
6

See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, republic.com 3-5 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001) [hereinafter Sunstein]. Sunstein
posits a scenario in which everyone has access to “The Daily Me,” containing only the information that
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framers’ objective to promote knowledge – and the duration of any protection at all
should be severely limited.
It is doubtful that any of the changes proposed here would prompt the media
conglomerates to jettison otherwise profitable news operations, but, where they do, the
resultant spin-offs may be more strongly committed to quality journalism. Fine-tuning
the copyright law with respect to news might restore among executives and working
journalists alike some sense of public service obligation. And diluting the industry’s
news-as-property attitude might even make a favorable impression on the increasingly
disillusioned audience.
Part I examines the state of contemporary journalism, particularly with respect to
the propertization of news. After inadequately summarizing a theoretical foundation laid
out by C. Edwin Baker, it concludes that whatever benefits news-as-property may have
brought to the public in the past, the time has come for the public to reclaim the news
from the media conglomerates. Part II traces the history of copyright protection for news,
from its origins in censorship to the American copyright regime today, with emphasis on
the run up to the 1909 amendments that first codified protection for newspapers. It
concludes that neither the fact-expression dichotomy, nor the fair use doctrine,
adequately protects the public interest in news.
Part III advocates the removal of copyright protection for all printed and
broadcast news, imposing only a 24-hour embargo on republication or rebroadcasting and
the moral rights of attribution and integrity. It also deals with real or imagined problems
with this approach and suggests ways of dealing with them, including defining news,
curtailing free riders, and preserving quality journalism.

suits each consumer – at the expense of the shared experiences that he sees as vital to our democracy.
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Part I Where are we now?
A. Who owns the news?
Under both American copyright law7 and international copyright agreements,8 the
“news of the day” belongs to the public. Once that “news” is communicated, however,
American law provides that copyright subsists in the expression which embodies the
news.9 That copyright is owned by the author,10 which, for most of the news that
concerns us here, is defined as the publisher or broadcasting company.11
So, who owns the publishers and broadcasting companies? When we examine ownership
patterns of newspapers, magazines, broadcasters, cable operators, and other media

7

The U.S. Copyright Act, provides that, “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). News, in the abstract, is repeatedly held to be encompassed by this provision.
See, e.g., Harper & Row v. The Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557 (1985) (“The Second Circuit noted,
correctly, that copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy ‘strike[s] a definitional balance between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author’s expression.’”)

8

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 2(8) (July 24, 1971), 1986 U.S.T.
LEXIS 160 [hereinafter Berne Convention], explicitly excludes from the scope of protection “news of the
day” and “miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information.”
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17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Technically, the information must be “fixed in a tangible medium of expression”;
typically, the requisite fixation occurs when the news is published or when the first copy of a broadcast is
made. See Ga. TV Co. v. TV News Clips, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 939, 946 (N.D. Ga. Atlanta Div. 1989)
(“copyright protection attaches to the broadcast feature only when the first copy of the transmission is
made”).
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17 U.S.C. § 201(a).

11

17 U.S.C. § 201(b) provides that, “In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the
copyright.” A “work made for hire” is a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment or commissioned work upon mutual written agreement. 17 U.S.C. § 101. After New York
Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001), freelance contracts now typically include a “work made for hire”
clause or other provisions granting publishers the right to use purchased freelance articles without
meaningful restriction or further compensation. See, e.g., Marx v. Globe Newspaper Co., 2002 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 455 (2002) (finding that The Boston Globe newspaper was entitled to impose such license
terms on its freelancers).
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companies for whom news represents more than a de minimis percentage of content, we
find an unmistakable and well-documented trend toward concentration.
Consider first the newspaper industry and the rise of group ownership. In 1923,
31 newspaper groups owned a total 153 newspapers – about 7% of all daily
newspapers.12 “By 1996, 126 groups published an aggregate of 1,151 newspapers,
accounting for 76% of the total number of dailies and 82% of daily circulation.” 13 At the
same time, competition among newspapers within cities declined dramatically. In 1923,
502 cities had two or more directly competing newspapers; by 1996, only 19 cities or
1.3% of all cities and towns with daily newspapers had direct competition among daily
newspapers.14
Magazine publishing is marginally less concentrated than newspaper publishing,
and the trend is toward even more dispersion.15 Of the 50 largest-circulation titles in
1997, however, only three are oriented toward a general news market: Time(14th),
Newsweek (19th), U.S. News and World Report (29th).16 Of those three, only U.S. News
is independently owned.17 Time is owned by one of the largest media conglomerates in
the world, AOL Time Warner, with annual revenues exceeding $40 billion;18 Newsweek

12

Benjamin M. Compaine & Douglas Gomery, Who Owns the Media: Competition and Concentration in
the Mass Media Industry 8 (Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. 3d ed. 2000)[hereinafter Compaine & Gomery].

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id. at 161.

16

Id. at 164.

17

Id.
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is owned by the Washington Post Corp., which is relying less and less on news for its
total revenue each year.19
Commercial broadcast television is dominated large multimedia conglomerates:
Walt Disney Corp., which owns ABC; General Electric, which owns NBC; Viacom,
which owns CBS and UPN; News Corp., which owns Fox; and the aforementioned Time
Warner, which owns the WB network.20 The PAX network was launched in 1998 by
Paxon Communications, which owned 50 local television stations at the time.21
Although television networking, by itself, is a roughly breakeven financial
proposition, station ownership enjoys high profit margins.22 Television stations, like
daily newspapers, are increasingly owned in media groups – especially after the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 eliminated the cap on the number of stations that any
one company could own and permitted any company to own stations covering up to 35%
of TV households.23 As of April 1998, the top 25 groups, whose members owned or

18

Press Release from AOL Time Warner, AOL Time Warner Reports Results for 2002 Full Year and
Fourth Quarter (Jan. 29, 2003), http://www.aoltimewarner.com/investors/ quarterly_earnings/2002_4q/
release.adp (accessed Nov. 22, 2003).

19

Michael Scherer, The Post Company’s New Profile, 2002 Col. Journ. Rev. 44 (Sept./Oct.) (reporting that
newspaper and magazine divisions’ contribution to revenues declined from 68 percent of the total in 1993
to 51 percent in 2002).

20

Jonathan Levy, Marcelino Ford-Livene & Anne Levine, Broadcast Television: Survivor in a Sea of
Competition 27-28 (Fed. Commun. Commn. Off. Plans & Policies Working Paper No. 37 Sept. 2002)
(available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A22.doc) [hereinafter FCC
37].
21

Compaine & Gomery, supra n. 12, at 208.

22

FCC 37, supra n. 20, at 39.

23

Compaine & Gomery, supra n. 12, at 222.
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controlled 432 or 36% of the 1,202 commercial television stations in the country, up from
33% in 1997 and 25% in 1996.24
At this writing, it remained to be seen how the FCC’s order of June 2, 2003,
lifting the ban on cross-ownership of newspapers and television stations and relaxing
other ownership rules will alter this picture,25 but the early speculation had “mighty”
growing mightier, “while smaller competitors fall by the wayside.”26 Opponents
mounted challenges to the FCC order in both the courts and Congress, and the Third
Circuit stayed its effect.27
Although television stations had always been required to dedicate some air time to
public affairs under the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine,28 TV news only became a profit center
in the 1990s.29 Those profits flowed not from better hard news coverage, but from highly
profitable news magazine shows like CBS’s 60 Minutes and 48 Hours, NBC’ s Dateline,
and ABC’s 20/20 and Prime Time Live.30 By the late 1990s, these programs accounted
for more than 10 hours per week in prime time in the three largest networks.31

24

Id.

25

FCC Press Release, FCC Sets Limits on Media Concentration (June 2, 2003) (describing Report and
Order, FCC 03-127 (June 2, 2003), and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).

26

Alec Klein & David A. Vise, Media Giants Hint That They Might Be Expanding, 126 Wash. Post A6
(June 3, 2003). See also Mark Fitzgerald & Lucia Moses, Putting it Together, 135 Editor & Publisher 10
(Feb. 18, 2002)(offers an early look at expected newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership mergers).
27

Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18390 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2003). Earlier, the
House of Representatives approved legislation that to roll back much of the FCC’s action by a vote of 400
to 21. H.R. 2799, 108th Cong., 149 Cong. Rec. H7369 (daily ed. July 23, 2003). The Senate subsequently
approved 55-40 a joint resolution to disapprove the FCC’s proposal. Sen. Jt. Res. 17, 108th Cong., 149
Cong. Rec. S11519 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2003).
28

See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969) (upholding FCC Fairness Doctrine that
“broadcasters must give adequate coverage to public issues … and coverage must be fair in that it
accurately reflects the opposing views”).
29

Compaine & Gomery, supra n.1 2, at 215.
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Most Americans actually receive their televised news programming over a coaxial
cable, rather than over the air, regardless of its source.32 Locally, cable operators are
almost always monopolies;33 nationally, they too are increasingly concentrated in large
media groups (including both multiple system operators and networks).34 Parent
companies of the top cable television operations are household names: Time Warner,
which owns the CNN family of stations; Walt Disney, which owns the ESPN sports
channels; News Corp., which owns the Fox news networks; and General Electric, which
controls MSNBC and CNBC.35 At this writing, News Corp. was making a strong bid to
control the primary alternative to cable, direct satellite broadcasting (DBS).36
Radio offers yet another source of news to the public, although original news
gathering is relatively rare on radio today. Stations typically carry network or syndicated
news programming, often with a few local headlines culled from wire services or local
newspapers.37 Only news/talk and all-news formatted stations hire their own reporters,38

30

Id. at 215-16.

31

Id. at 216.

32

Id. at 247.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 250.

35

Id. at 252.

36

On Dec. 19, 2003, the FCC gave conditional approval to the sale of Hughes Electronics
Corp.’s DirecTV, the nation’s largest DBS system. In the Matter of General Motors
Corp. and Hughes Electronics Corp., Transferors, and The News Corp. Ltd., Transferee,
For Authority to Transfer Control, MB Docket No. 03-124 (Dec. 19, 2003) [hereinafter In
re General Motors].
37

Compaine & Gomery, supra n. 12, at 293.

38

Id. at 293.
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and the latter represents less than 1% of the radio market.39 News/talk stations represent
a larger share of the market, about 12%-13% of the market,40 but in most cases the news
presented by those stations seems to be drowned out by the overwhelming volume of
talk.
Thus, most people receive most of their news from a local monopoly (newspaper
or cable company) owned or controlled by a large media company. And, overall, the
trend toward concentration seems inexorable. So what? Conventional wisdom says that
monopolization of news sources locally and concentration of ownership nationally
diminishes the number and diversity of voices that reach the public. Intuitively, at least,
the marketplace of ideas would seem to become poorer.
But the evidence is at least mixed. Benjamin M. Compaine writes:

The overwhelming weight of the research has shown that, with snapshots
taken over several decades, corporately owned newspapers and
“monopoly” newspapers are, overall, either indistinguishable from familyowned papers or, by some accounts, superior.
There is little empirical evidence that either chain-owned
newspapers or newspapers in single-firm cities as a group provide poorer
service to readers or advertisers than independent or competing
newspapers.41
And while it might be difficult to find much difference among network and local
affiliate news broadcasts, most Americans have access to National Public Radio, the
Public Broadcasting System, and C-SPAN, whose journalism – mediated and unmediated

39

Id. at 295.

40

Id.

41

Compaine & Gomery, supra n. 12, at 54.
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– is as good as any, anywhere. CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC might be more alike than
different, but they set the standard for coverage and delivery of breaking news.
Washington Post veterans Leonard Downie and Robert Kaiser point out that the
“best news products [have] continued to thrive in the marketplace.

The New York Times, National Public Radio, the Wall Street Journal, the
Washington Post – all have done well journalistically and financially,
though the advertising recession of 2000-2001 hurt them all. The best
metropolitan papers also thrived, including the St. Petersburg Times, the
Dallas Morning News, the Sacramento Bee and the Portland Oregonian.
Those newspapers and television news broadcasts that declined in quality
– the Miami Herald, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, CBS News – lost more
of their audience than the best news media.42
Then, too, we have the Internet, which arguably raises the number of publishers
and broadcasters to infinity. Even so strident a media critic as Robert McChesney writes
that, “For activists of all political stripes, the Web increasingly plays a central role in
organizing and educational activities.”43 That may not be journalism in the conventional
sense, but it provides determined and discriminating consumers with all of the facts and
opinions they need to make the decisions that a democratic society expects of them.
So, what’s wrong? Good journalism continues to exist and even thrive,
notwithstanding the occasional lapse by America’s finest.44 Arguably, there is more good
journalism available than ever before; unarguably, there is more information available
than ever before.
42

Leonard Downie Jr. & Robert G. Kaiser, The News About the News: American Journalism in Peril 29
(Vintage Books 2003) [hereinafter Downie & Kaiser].

43

Robert W. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communicating Politics in Dubious Times 183
(The New Press 2000) [hereinafter McChesney].
44

The widespread schadenfreude prompted by the recent Jayson Blair episode is itself the best evidence of
the New York Times’s overall quality. For a sampling, see Journalism.org at
http://www.journalism.org/resources/briefing/archive/blair.asp#blair (accessed Feb. 1, 2004).
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What’s wrong is that most of us don’t read the New York Times or watch
Nightline or listen to NPR or scour the Web for contrasting views on the important issues
of the day. Instead, we watch the six o’clock news on television (sometimes), read the
local chain newspaper (maybe), and see (or click past) AOL’s choice of headlines on the
Internet. And it’s dreadful. Whatever news value these media may offer is drowned out
by commercialism, sensationalism and junk.45
Downie and Kaiser point out that, where news makes a relatively small
contribution to overall profits, the news hole is increasingly sacrificed to higher value
entertainment. Straight news broadcasts are often used to promote entertainment
programming, while so-called broadcast newsmagazines feature so many crime and
celebrity stories that they compete for prime-time ratings with dramas and sitcoms.46

Where news still contributes substantially to an owner’s bottom line,
“[n]ewspaper editors and television news directors… have been held more
accountable for controlling costs and increasing profits than for improving
the quality of their journalism.”47
One way to increase profits, says Herbert Gans, is to add “ ‘style’ and other ‘soft’
news sections in the hope of attracting, or at least maintaining, more readers or viewers
and advertisers.”48 Often that means increasing reliance on the soft news output of

45

See, e.g., Matthew C. Ehrlich, The Journalism of Outrageousness: Tabloid Television News vs.
Investigative News, 155 Journalism & Mass Comm. Monographs (Feb. 1996). I use the term “junk”
advisedly. To paraphrase Neil Postman, I’m not concerned about the undisguised junk one finds in the
media, but rather the junk that publishers and broadcasters pass off as news. See Neil Postman, Amusing
Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business 16 (Penguin Books 1985).

46

Downie & Kaiser, supra n. 42, at 25.

47

Id. See also Geneva Overholser, Editor, Inc., 20Amer. Journalism Rev. 58 (Dec. 1998).

48

Herbert J. Gans, Democracy and the News 23 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003) [hereinafter Gans].
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national syndicates at the expense of local hard news reporting and, most notably, foreign
news.49 On the latter point, Gans was speaking primarily about the television networks.
But even the revered New York Times has experienced a decline in international news
coverage, relying more and more on “borrowed” news, that is, news first disseminated by
and attributed to another news organization.50
But these are merely symptoms of a much deeper malady that pervades today’s
mass media: the absence of a public service ethos in what passes as journalism. I say
“what passes,” because public service is a defining element of journalism. Indeed, that
notion runs throughout the literature of contemporary journalism criticism. McChesney
writes:

The clear trajectory of our media and communication world tends toward
ever-greater corporate concentration, media conglomeration, and
hypercommercialism. The notion of public service – that there should be
some motive for media other than profit – is in rapid retreat if not total
collapse. The public is regarded not as a democratic polity, but simply as
a mass of consumers.51
It is not necessary to subscribe to McChesney’s leftist, anti-corporate philosophy
to see that he’s right on this point. Downie and Kaiser also lament the loss of a public
service orientation in today’s media. The great newspaper families “drew pleasure from
their roles as purveyors of a public service – good journalism” – even when profitability
was meager. Even the first owners of the television networks were “willing to sacrifice
some profit for public service.”52
49

Id.

50

Daniel Riffe et al., International News and Borrowed News in the New York Times: An Update, 70
Journalism Q. 638 (1993).

51

McChesney, supra n. 43, at 76-77.
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Kovach and Rosenstiel put public service, which they characterize as “loyalty to
citizens,” as the second element of journalism, subordinate only a commitment to the
truth.53 James Fallows writes that journalism exists for reasons other than satisfying the
desire of publishers and broadcasters to make money, but to satisfy the public’s desire for
meaningful information.54 Even Jack Fuller, a journalist’s journalist, but also president
of the Tribune Publishing Co., defends success in the marketplace as necessary to ensure
the independence required to fulfill newspapers’ social purpose of providing the
information people need.55
To Fuller, “the question is not whether a newspaper should serve the public
interest or the financial interests of its owners. The question is how it can best square the
two.”56 As one might expect, most of the solutions proposed in the literature depend on
reform within the media corporations, led by the professional journalists. Fuller
emphasizes the “church and state” metaphor coined by Time Magazine to refer to the
separation between business and editorial departments within media corporations.57
Fallows sees the trend called “public journalism” as a good starting point.58 And Gans
52

Downie & Kaiser, supra n. 42, at 26.

53

Kovach & Rosenstiel, supra n. 4, at 51.

54

James Fallows, Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy 129 (Vintage
Books 1997) [hereinafter Fallows].

55

Jack Fuller, News Values: Ideas for an Information Age 198 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1997).

56

Id. at 199.

57

Id.

58

Fallows, supra n. 54 at 247. I will not get into the “public journalism” or “civic journalism” debate in
this article, except to say that I tend to reject the concept that journalists ought to practice their craft in a
manner calculated to improve civic life, rather than see civic life improved by practicing their craft in a
manner consistent with high journalistic values. For more on the movement, visit The Pew Center for
Civic Journalism at http://www.pewcenter.org, The Civic Journalism Initiative at
http://access.mpr.org/civic_j, Public Journalism Bibliography on Poynter Online at
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offers a number of suggestions, including “user-friendly” news, localizing national and
international news, explanatory journalism, and more.59
Understandably, media critics are generally uncomfortable looking to the law for
solutions to this problem. If the First Amendment means anything, it means that
government ought not be telling journalists how to do their jobs.60 The exception has
been broadcasting, where regulation has been held constitutionally permissible,61 and
there was no dearth of media critics calling upon the Federal Communications
Commission to refrain from lifting the ownership caps on radio and television stations
last summer.62 Antitrust laws undoubtedly apply to media companies,63 but neither the

http://poynteronline.org/content/content_view.asp?id=1223, Public Journalism Network at
http://www.pjnet.org (accessed Feb. 1, 2004).
59

Gans, supra n. 48, at 91-112.

60

See Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (“The choice of material to go into a newspaper,
and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues
and public officials – whether fair or unfair – constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It
has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent
with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.”)
61

Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 390 (“Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is
permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique
medium.”)

62

See notes 24-27 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Neil Hickey, FCC: Ready, Set, Consolidate, 42
Colum. Journalism Rev. 5 (July/Aug. 2003):
The oddest of bedfellows joined forces to fight the proposed changes. On the right: the
National Rifle Association, Family Research Council, Parents Television Council; on the
left: Common Cause, Consumers Union, NOW. (“A dark day for democracy,” said
Common Cause’s president.) Legislators, from Mississippi’s Trent Lott to North
Carolina’s Ernest Hollings, demanded that the rules be left in place. More than 750,000
messages from angry citizens and groups clogged the FCC’s mailroom and e-mail
servers.”
63

Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (“The First Amendment, far from providing an argument
against application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary. ... Freedom of the
press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that
freedom by private interests.”) See also Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of
Antitrust, 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 503, 517-18 (2001) (“[M]edia mergers should be carefully scrutinized for loss
of non-price competition along the dimension of diversity in programming.”).
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FCC nor the Justice Department has shown much inclination to stop or slow
concentration in the media industry.64
This article suggests that withdrawing copyright protection from print and
broadcast journalism may represent a modest, perhaps largely symbolic step toward
reducing the sense among media companies that news is just a commodity and restoring a
sense of public service in the practice of journalism. This thesis presupposes that
copyright law is at least a modest contributor to the problem, and we find theoretical
support for that proposition in the work of Professor Baker.

B. The Baker Analysis
Baker points out that media content, once produced, is a “public good”; that is, its
consumption in no way reduces its availability to others.65 Ideally, then, the public
would derive maximum value from media content as its cost approached zero. But a
zero-cost regime would provide no incentive for producing media content, so copyright
law is imposed to create a private property interest that encourages the content
production. “Exceptions” to that regime – such as the fact-expression dichotomy and fair
use doctrine – permit free use of the content “whenever free use adds more value than it
‘costs’” in reduced incentives to produce more content.66
Baker suggests, however, that the incentive value of copyright law is of little
importance with respect to noncommercial political or cultural communications and may
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See, e.g., In re General Motors, supra n. 36, and accompanying text. Columbia Journalism Review
maintains a list of more than 40 media companies and the properties they own. See “Who Owns What” at
http://archives.cjr.org/owners/ (visited Feb. 1, 2004).
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even be exaggerated with respect to some commercial speech.67 As we will explore
further in Part III, news would appear to be one of those categories that benefits least
from the incentive to produce afforded by copyright protection. In any event, Baker
points out that copyright protection “not only favors commercialization, but also tilts
production toward particular types of content.”68
Since copyright does not protect the purely factual elements of news, its
effectiveness in creating incentives to gather and disseminate news is questionable. More
likely, copyright favors more investment in “unique entertainment content” and “flashy
presentation” and less investment in hard news … “especially news that is expensive to
obtain. … Anchorperson personalities and their expressive delivery, not facts and ideas
that other stations can freely appropriate, are the [broadcast] station’s unique goods.”69

Competitive, profit-oriented pressures could lead media entities to
abandon expensive, investigative journalism and replace it with
cheaper, routine beat reporting, or even cheaper “press-release” or
wire service journalism. The market could tilt journalism toward
stories that are the easiest (i.e., cheapest) to uncover and, even
more troubling, the easiest to explain or the most titillating.70
Baker acknowledges that, “[t]o the extent that a broad [copy]right increases the
commercial rewards of writing and of journalism, it provides greater incentives for

67
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undertaking that work.”71 On the other hand, he says, copyright might be the one form of
structural media regulation that would benefit audiences more by its absence.72
Since copyright is a “legal mechanism for restricting the content of other people’s
expression,”73 ratcheting back on the scope of copyright for journalism should face no
serious constitutional obstacle.74 The case can be further strengthened by exploring the
historical relationship between journalism and copyright law and inadequacies of
copyright “exceptions” to protect the public’s interest in news.
Part II – How did we get here?
A.

Copyright’s Precursors and Censorship

The connection between early copyright law and royal censorship is hardly a
compelling reason for journalists to shun today’s intellectual property protection. Ray
Patterson notes that “[c]ensorship in England began without any reference to copyright,
and there is little doubt that copyright would have developed without it.”75 But Patterson
and others have chronicled a relationship between the two that, if nothing else, ought to
suggest that journalism and copyright may not be the most compatible partners.
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Mitchell Stephens writes, “When they were not exploiting the printing presses
themselves, monarchs and their ministers busied themselves monitoring the presses –
which were ostensibly in private hands – and making sure the news others printed on
them was not, as a British jurist was to put it some years later, ‘possessing the people
with an ill opinion of the government.’”76 If the negative instruments of Tudor
censorship regimes – treason and seditious libel laws – were more colorful, the positive
instruments – licensing and monopolies – were more effective and long lived.
“Privileges” to print certain types of information were distributed to certain
printers as early as 1467 in Berne,77 but Henry, Mary, and Elizabeth of England raised the
practice to a high art. On Christmas Day, 1534, Henry, who had earlier banned heretical
and blasphemous books, issued a proclamation requiring all printers to obtain a royal
license.78 Not coincidentally, that was the same year the Act of Succession prohibited
any “slander” of Henry’s marriage to Anne Boleyn, on penalty of death. Four years later,
by royal proclamation, Henry would establish a licensing system for all books, requiring
any manuscript intended for publication to be submitted to royal censors, empowered to
excise seditious opinions and other objectionable materials or deny license to print
altogether.79
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Henry’s daughter Mary built on that foundation in 1557 by issuing a royal charter
giving the ancient guild of scribes, limners, printers, publishers, and dealers known as the
Stationers’ Company the exclusive rights, other than the crown, to operate and enforce
the licensing regime. As Siva Vaidhyanathan points out,

Only members of the company could legally produce books. The only
books they would print were approved by the Crown. The company was
authorized to confiscate unsanctioned books. It was a sweet deal for the
publishers. They got exclusivity – monopoly power to print and distribute
specific works – the functional foundation to copyright. The only price
they paid was relinquishing the freedom to print disagreeable or dissenting
texts.80
During the reign of Mary’s successor, Elizabeth I, the relationship between
censorship and the Stationers’ monopoly grew even closer. Patterson demonstrates that
the Stationers saw the increasing need for censorship as a lever they could use to enhance
and perpetuate the economic prosperity that monopoly brought.81 The Stationers’
lobbying played an important, although not decisive role, in the promulgation of the Star
Chamber Decree of 1586, the major regulatory achievement of the Elizabethan period.82
This comprehensive prescription for controlling the presses was expressly intended to
deal with “contentyous and disorderlye persons professinge the arte or mysterye of
Pryntinge or sellinge of bookes.”83
The political chaos that marked the Stuart dynasty gave rise to both the first
prototypes of the modern newspaper and the use of monopoly power to suppress them.
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Emery points out that neither the balladeers nor pamphleteers of the time were up to the
demand for news about the various religious and political struggles of the early 17th
Century. The commercial news-letters were better, but not generally affordable.84 The
corantos that emerged around 1620 only covered foreign news, but that did not stop
James I from using the Stationers to arrest and imprison coranto printer Thomas Archer
for “great liberty of discourse concerning matters of state.”85
Domestic news coverage was even more controversial, but, with the king and
Parliament in stalemate, diurnalls carrying local news surfaced in the 1640s. The
Stationers had succeeded in promoting a more draconian Star Chamber Decree in 1637,
but the Long Parliament abolished the Star Chamber itself in 1641 and relaxed many of
the restrictions on the press. The Stationers continued to press for controls, as shown by
their second petition to Parliament in 1643.
Acknowledging the importance of printing, the petition reminds Parliament that
“it is not mere Printing, but well ordered Printing that merits so much favour and respect,
since in things precious and excellent, the abuse (if not prevented) is commonly as
dangerous, as the use is advantageous.”86 Components of “well ordered” printing
included censorship, monopoly over the printing presses, and copyright, all of which
were included in the Ordinance of 1643. Its emphasis on the latter, the “propriety of
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Copies,” brought us closer to modern copyright law,87 but the link with censorship was to
continue for some years yet.
Indeed, the proliferation of newspaper prototypes – the curanto, diurnall, mercury
and intelligencer – was largely responsible for the Ordinance of 1647, styled “An
Ordinance against unlicensed or scandalous Pamphlets, and for the better Regulating of
Printing.”88 Patterson points out that this was the first act of censorship directed as much
to authors as to printers, providing

[t]hat what person soever shall Make, Write, Print, Publish, Sell or Utter…
any Book, Pamphlet, Treatise, Ballad, Libel, Sheet or Sheets, the Author,
Printer and Licenser thereunto prefixed) shall for every such Offence,
suffer, pay and incur the Punishment, Fine and Penalty hereafter
mentioned….89
Two years later, those penalties were increased by the Ordinance of 1649, aimed
at “the mischiefs arising from weekly pamphlets.”90 Under that act, the Clerk of
Parliament was designated to license the pesky newsbooks,91 which had flourished in the
civil war period.92
According to Emery, “the press again fell upon evil days” with the advent of
Oliver Cromwell’s dictatorship,93 although Patterson indicates that the Puritans ultimately
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failed in their efforts at controlling the press.94 After the Restoration, the Stationers
lobbied for the restoration of their old power. The Licensing Act of 1662 was similar to
the Ordinances of 1647 and 1649, but the Company lost its role in press censorship to the
Surveyor of the Press. The Licensing Act was allowed to lapse in 1679, and, although
the Stationers tried to renew their monopoly through a censorship law as late as 1703,95
the link between copyright and censorship was finally severed. Copyright law, beginning
with the Statute of Anne in 1709, had lost its censorship function.96
Or has it? Patterson ends his study with a prescient warning that today’s
copyright law typically grants publishers complete control of the work – the expression
of ideas for profit. “A vestige of the heritage of censorship in the law of copyright
remains in the interest of profit.”97 Be that as it may, it is not the core of this argument,
so we turn to the treatment of news media under historical and contemporary copyright
law.
B.

Subject Matter of Copyright Before 1909

There is no textual evidence that the copyright laws of the 18th and 19th
Centuries ever contemplated newspapers as covered subject matter. The Statute of
Anne,98 generally considered the first British copyright statute,99 covered books and parts
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of books, although the ambiguous phrase “other writings” was included in the
parliamentary findings of frequent copying.100
By the time of the American constitutional convention, 12 of the13 states already
had copyright laws.101 Most of the early American state statutes also covered only books,
or books and writings,102 or books, maps and charts.103 Statutes of Connecticut (1783),
Georgia (1786) and New York (1786) governed “any book or pamphlet… or… any map
or chart.”104
To harmonize the various state copyright statutes,105 the framers authorized
Congress “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”106 But while the constitutional provision speaks only of “writings,” the
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Federal Copyright Act of 1790 specified “maps, charts, and books,” including
unpublished manuscripts.107
Any thought that newspapers might be subsumed by the inherent ambiguity of
“writings” is quickly laid to rest with a look at the government-subsidized practice of
newspaper exchanges. At least until the availability of low-cost telegraphy became
widespread,108 newspaper articles were more or less freely exchanged among publishers,
with frontier newspapers often gleaning a substantial proportion of their news from
Eastern city papers.
The practice of exchanging newspapers goes back to colonial times. Andrew
Bradford, publisher of the American Weekly Mercury, launched in 1719 as Philadelphia’s
first newspaper, gathered non-local news through the exchange of letters and the
cultivation of correspondents around the world.

Perhaps most important as a means of news gathering, Bradford and other
publishers liberally copied one another’s papers. Bradford borrowed from
several dozen British publications and later, with the establishment of
more papers in the colonies and improvements in transportation, he began
helping himself to newspaper accounts published along the Atlantic Coast.
Stories from other papers were typically printed verbatim and, in the
Mercury’s first years of publication, sources were not regularly credited.
Identification became more common later, however, and the Mercury’s
sources multiplied, relating to both European and American news.109
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Indeed, the very first policy regarding the carriage of newspapers by the colonial
Post Office in 1758 recognized the practice of exchanging papers among printers and
exempted those papers from any postage fees.110 That policy remained virtually
unchanged until the 1870s.111 The importance of the exchanges is illustrated by evidence
that postmaster-publishers occasionally punished rivals by delaying their exchange
papers.112 The practice also served commercial interests and, during and after the
Revolutionary War period, political interests as well.113 Preferential postal rates for
newspapers were almost universally endorsed in the early days of the Republic, and the
practice of exchanging newspapers among printers was a matter of concern to President
Washington himself.114
When Congress enacted the first postal law in 1782, no reference was made to
newspaper exchanges among printers, and the matter was left to the discretion of the
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Postmaster General.115 Ten years later, however, Congress expressly provided for
printers’ exchanges: “That every printer of newspapers may send one paper to each and
every other printer of newspapers within the United States, free of postage, under such
regulations as the Postmaster General shall provide.”116 Exchanges were so attractive
that, by 1812, frontier newspapers were borrowing seven times more news than they
gathered locally.117 In fact, regular, active news gathering did not begin until the
1830s.118
Congressional support for the printers’ exchanges was so strong that the practice
weathered any number of proposals by budget-conscious Postmasters General to curtail
or end the practice during the early 19th Century.119 Occasionally, editors would append
a notice to their stories and advertisements instructing distant editors to copy them,
thereby extending the range of their influence.120 It is obvious from contemporary
descriptions of how those exchanges were used that notions of copyright infringement
were entirely alien to the process:

We seated ourselves at the… table, on which were scissors, paste-dish,
pen and ink, the indispensable implements of our profession, to commence
our ordinary labour. At first, to prepare the subject matter of the next
day’s dailyJournal . Having cast our eye over Mr. Lang’s New York
Gazette, and Mr. Dwight’s Daily Advertiser, (our invariable standards of
news from that city, notwithstanding the high repute of Mr. Stone’s
Commercial) and clipped out a few paragraphs, the Washington papers
115
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were next put in requisition. An article in the National Journal, or the
National Intelligencer, we undertook to remanufacturing (giving the
Journal, or the Intelligencer credit for the new material).121
But if copyright protection was not an issue, editors felt strongly about receiving
credit for their efforts. Editorials regularly denounced the use of stories without proper
attribution, and regular offenders might be struck from exchange lists.122 One early news
magazine publisher lamented, “I have an article before me that I myself made, that was
published at Boston as original, copied into a Baltimore paper without credit, and inserted
in an Albany paper as belonging to the newspaper last noted.”123 A New Jersey editor
acknowledged that news items were “common property,” but insisted that to “transplant
original matter… unacknowledged, is neither honest nor honorable; … pillaging a paper
is equal to picking a pocket.”124
Ultimately, the telegraph would erode the importance of postal exchanges, but
exchanges remained “indispensable” to remote newspapers for 20 or more years after the
telegraph was invented.125 At first, the telegraph was enlisted merely to help editors cover
part of the distance between originating and consuming newspapers. Increasingly,
however, the economies of the telegraph dictated that news items be summarized, leaving
to exchanges the distribution of more complex, opinionated, or narrowly focused
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stories.126 Even after the rise of cooperative news agencies and the evolution of the
modern, hard-news story form, exchanges were used to circulate features and political
commentary.127 In 1851, Post Office extended the free exchange privilege to include
magazines.128
During the period 1847-1860, some 30 percent of the stories carried in daily and
other newspapers were clipped from other papers, presumably received on exchange, but
the free ride was coming to an end. Bowing to pressure from Postmaster General
Montgomery Blair, Congress eliminated the practice of free exchanges in 1873.129
Other evidence that news was not considered a proper subject for copyright
protection in what little case law we have from those days. In the early case of Clayton v.
Stone, Circuit Justice Thompson cited both the text of the copyright law and the burden
that copyright would impose on would-be registrants to hold that a price-current, an early
form of commercial newspaper or newsletter, could not be the proper subject of
copyright.130 Plaintiffs had argued that their publication qualified for copyright
protection as a book, but the court rejected that view based on the “subject-matter of the
work” in question.131 In an explanation later quoted extensively with approval by the
Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden,132 Justice Thompson said the Copyright Act
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was passed in execution of the power here given, and the object, therefore
was the promotion of science; and it would certainly be a pretty
extraordinary view of the sciences to consider a daily or weekly
publication of the state of the market as falling within any class of them.
They are of a more fixed, permanent and durable character. The term
science cannot, with any propriety, be applied to a work of so fluctuating
and fugitive form as that of a newspaper or pricecurrent, the subject-matter
of which is daily changing, and is of more temporary use. Although great
praise may be due to the plaintiffs for their industry and enterprise in
publishing this paper, yet the law does not contemplate their being
rewarded in this way; it must seek patronage and protection from its utility
to the public and not as a work of science. The title of the act of congress
is for the encouragement of learning (citation omitted), and was not
intended for the encouragement of mere industry, unconnected with
learning and the sciences.133
The court proceeded to recount the burdensome steps required at that time to
secure a copyright, finding they could not “reasonably be applied to a work of so
ephemeral a character as that of a newspaper.”134 Since the copyright had to be secured
for every edition, rather than for an entire series, the court said,

it is so improbable that any publisher of a newspaper would go through
this form for every paper, it cannot reasonably be presumed that congress
intended to include newspapers under the term book. That no such
pretence has ever before been set up, either in England or in this country,
affords a pretty strong argument that such publications were never
considered as falling under the protection of the copyright laws.135
If that interpretation of the Copyright Act was still good law in 1880, when Baker
v. Selden was decided, it was no longer so by 1886, when the very same court that
decided Clayton v. Stone considered a copyright granted to Harper’s Weekly, described
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as an “illustrated newspaper.”136 In Harper v. Shoppell, the court held that the “copyright
of the plaintiff’s newspaper was a copyright of a book, within the meaning of the
copyright laws.”137 Although the court ultimately held for the defendant on other
grounds, the decision in no way questioned the validity of Harper’s copyright. What had
changed?
C.

Propertization of News in 19th Century

The mid-19th Century saw continued expansion in the scope of copyright, both
legislatively and administratively. In the 1831 general revision of the Act, copyright
protection was extended to musical compositions and cuts and engravings.138
Photographs were added in 1865.139 And in 1870, Congress added paintings, drawings,
chromos, statues, statuary, and “models or designs intended to be perfected as works of
the fine arts.”140 Following the 1870 revision, the Copyright Office began accepting
registrations as books from some weekly newspaper publishers.141
The 1870s have been singled out as a critical decade in the transition of American
newspapers from an elite press, dependent for support upon political parties, to a
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politically independent, mass market business.142 During that decade, the number and
size of newspapers nearly doubled, subscription prices declined, and independents came
to outnumber partisan papers.143 These dramatic changes have been variously attributed
to economic growth in the West and recovery in the South, rising literacy throughout the
country, and vastly improved communication and transportation infrastructure.144 Above
all, newspapers were making money.145
Newspapers were still not explicitly covered by the copyright statute, but the
practice of registering newspapers as books enabled the Harper court to stand Justice
Thompson’s analysis on its head. In Clayton, Thompson had pointed out that, in
England, literary productions need not be books “in the common and ordinary
acceptation of the word” in order to enjoy copyright protection.146 “It may be printed on
one sheet,” he wrote, to support the point that protection was “not to be determined by the
size, form or shape in which it makes its appearance, but by the subject-matter of the
work.”147
The Harper court omitted the final clause of that sentence, which lay at the very
heart of Clayton, and all other reference to subject matter. Instead, it used language from
Clayton to support the proposition that “a book… may consist of a single sheet, as well as
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a number of sheets bound together,”148 likeHarper’s illustrated newspaper. To be sure,
the Harper court could have distinguished the content of Harper’s Weekly from that of
the price-current at issue in Clayton, but it did not. Fine content distinctions played no
part in the Harper decision.
Metropolitan newspaper publishers had also begun to lobby Congress for
copyright protection by the time Harper was decided, although their first efforts were
half-hearted and, for more than twenty years, unsuccessful.149 As a consequence of the
growing commercial value of news,150 major publishers developed extensive
newsgathering networks and telegraphic wire services, then sought to protect their
investment through copyright.151
By 1879, James W. Simonton, general agent for the Associated Press, would
claim a “property in news… created by the fact of our collecting and concentrating it.”152
At the AP’s behest, Henry Watterson, editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal, was sent
in 1884 on what he described as a “fool’s errand” to persuade Congress to provide
explicit copyright protection for newspapers.153 Barbara Cloud discusses in some detail
the four bills relating to news copyright that were introduced during the First Session of
the 48th Congress.
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One bill154 allowed a periodical writer to copyright already published work after
giving notice six times in publications; that bill and another155 would have granted
copyright to newspaper “titles,” assumed to mean stories.156 More important were
S.1728157 and its companion, H.R.5850,158 which gave newspapers the “sole right to
print, issue and sell for a term of eight hours, dating from the hour of going to press,” the
stories in the newspaper that exceeded 100 words.159 The eight-hour period was
apparently reduced from twenty-four hours, which was also provided in H.R.4160, in
order to mollify legislators who feared that the bill would solely benefit the Associated
Press at the expense of country weeklies.160
Watterson insisted that the proposed law would not interfere with the weeklies’
practice of reprinting stories; they would be free to continue copying “anything that
pleases them,” after 7 a.m., but the legislation ultimately failed.161 The weekly press,
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which benefited from the practice of newspaper exchange, organized a substantial
lobbying campaign, including letter-writing and petitioning.162 Other critics of the
legislation found too little “original intellectual effort” in newsgathering to merit
copyright protection.163 Whether the Harper court was aware of the legislative failure of
the newspaper copyright is not apparent from the decision, but as long as newspapers
could be protected as “books,” it may not have mattered one way or the other.
That was certainly the view of Richard Rogers Bowker, head of Publisher’s
Weekly and the Publishers’ Copyright League.164 Writing in 1886, the same year Harper
was decided, Bowker acknowledged that “[a] specific act to protect news for twenty-four
hours has been proposed in Congress, but never passed.”165 But Bowker expressed
confidence, probably based more on Copyright Office practice than any legal grounds,
that “periodicals and books published in parts… come under the general designation of
books.”

Each issue of a magazine or other periodical must therefore be separately
entered as though a separate book, although the title may be registered as a
trade-mark once for all. All copyrightable matter contained in the issue
would then be copyrighted…. It seems probable that even a daily
newspaper could thus be copyrighted day by day at a cost of $365 per
year, so as to protect all its original material of substantial literary value.
A daily Price-List of the New York Cotton Exchange was so entered day
by day for some time, but the question of maintaining such a copyright
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seems never to have been tested in court. The New York Sun copyrights
its Sunday cable letter separately.166
Bowker did discuss some foreign precedents that supported his argument,
notwithstanding the fact that “the word ‘newspaper’ does not occur in the definitions of
the Act.”

When the London Times’s memoir of Beaconsfield was reprinted as a
penny pamphlet, the Times brought suit as a matter of common-law right,
but the judge held that a newspaper was copyrightable under the statute,
and therefore a common-law suit could not hold. It was held by Mr.
Justice Molesworth, in Melbourne, Australia, that a newspaper proprietor
had copyright in special news telegrams, and another paper was enjoined
from using them.”167
In any event, one further attempt to secure legislative recognition of the
newspaper copyright failed in 1899, and Cloud indicates it was even less successful than
Watterson’s 1884 campaign.168 Newspapers would not be explicitly mentioned in the
copyright statute until the 1909 revision, and then only in the most matter-of-fact way. By
then, however, the transformation of journalism from a public service to the manufacture
of product had been largely completed; Congress was merely acknowledging a fait
accompli: the propertization of news.
D. The 1909 Copyright Act
Before 1909, the only statutory provision in force that could have been construed
as relating to the copyright of newspapers was Sec. 11 of the Act of March 3, 1891,
which provided:
166
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That for the purpose of this act each volume of a book in two or more volumes,
when such volumes are published separately and the first one shall not have been
issued before this act shall take effect, and each number of a periodical shall be
considered an independent publication, subject to the form of copyright as
above.169
The word “newspaper” first appears in Sec. 5 of the 1909 revision of the
copyright act:

“Sec. 5. That the application for registration shall specify to which of the
following classes the work in which copyright is claimed belongs:
*

*

*

“b. Periodicals, including newspapers[.]”170
The House Report171 accompanying the new legislation saw no particular
significance in adding the term “newspapers.” Section 5, it said, “refers solely to a
classification made for the convenience of the copyright office and those applying for
copyrights.”172 Even more striking is the fact that the report of the Copyright Committee
of the American Newspaper Publishers Association does not even mention it.173
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The ANPA’s Copyright Committee was appointed in February 1905 “to act for
the Association in consideration of the copyright laws and the newspaper publishers [sic]
interest in them.”

There will probably be a general convention within the next few months on
copyrights and trade marks, and it is the purpose of the Association to be
represented in that convention by members of that committee. In the meantime,
we ask any member who has any suggestion to make in reference to changes or
additions to the copyright law to forward such suggestions to the New York office
of the Association.174
The committee was chaired by Theodore W. Noyes of the Washington Star and
included Louis M. Duvall of the Baltimore News and John Stewart Bryan of the
Richmond Times-Dispatch.175 Neither Noyes nor Duvall were able to attend the “general
convention,” which was held in New York on May 31, so Bryan and XXXX Seitz of the
New York World represented ANPA.176 The committee’s report is sketchy, to say the
least, but it appears that ANPA put in another futile word for protecting telegraphic news
items for some brief term of days or hours.177 Nor was any such provision to be
considered by the Library of Congress Copyright conference that convened in March
1906,178 and none was ever enacted into law.
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But the primary focus of the ANPA representatives was protecting their
membership from what the they viewed as excessive penalties for newspapers’ violations
of photographers’ copyrights.179 That issue would preoccupy the Copyright Committee
throughout the runup to the 1909 act. In 1907, for example, ANPA explained that the
committee “was appointed as a result of dissatisfaction with the existing law and
apprehension of new and more objectionable legislation in respect to the reproduction by
newspapers of copyrighted photographs.”180
The object of ANPA’s attention was a provision of the existing 1895 Copyright
Act that established heavy penalties for infringement of photographic copyrights,
including both injunctive relief and damages plus fines up to $10,000181 and a proposal
to add criminal penalties for willful infringement.182 In its Bulletin, ANPA published the
committee’s legal and practical arguments against such harsh treatment, urging language
to provide “that the reproduction of a photograph in any newspaper by the process known
as stereotyping shall not be construed as an infringement of the copyright of such
photograph.”183 At the very least, the committee argued, the penalties for such
infringement should be reduced to an amount commensurate with lost royalties, rather
than a punitive assessment per copy made.184 The committee also urged the adoption of a
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conspicuous copyright notice requirement for photographs185 and exemption from or
elimination of criminal penalties for infringement.186
In making its case, the ANPA referred to photographs in language reminiscent of
that used by Justice Thompson in rejecting copyright protection for newspapers,187
including “purely mechanical” and “unintellectual.”188 It also argued that reproduction of
photographs in newspapers actually increased their value to photographers189 – an
argument that would be rejected again many years later by courts reviewing the copyright
implications of music file sharing.190
In the end, Congress largely obliged the newspapers. “As a result of the efforts of
this committee, legislation affecting copyrights enacted in the closing hours of the
sixtieth Congress assumed a form on this point which eliminated or modified the new
legislative propositions most menacing to the newspaper publishing interests, and in
important respects distinctly improved the existing law.”191 After 1909, newspapers were

185

Id. at 6 (p. 90 of the 1907 bound volume).

186

Id. at 7 (p. 91 of the 1907 bound volume).

187

See infra n. 146 and accompanying text.

188

ANPA Bulletin No. 1581, § “B” Special, at 7 (Feb. 20, 1907) (p. 91 of the 1907 bound volume).

189

Id. at 5 (p. 89 of the 1907 bound volume).

190

See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001) (endorsing trial court’s rejection
of expert testimony that “Napster is beneficial to the music industry because MP3 music file-sharing
stimulates more audio CD sales than it displaces.”), and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F.
Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting defendant’s argument that its “activities can only enhance
plaintiffs’ sales, since subscribes cannot gain access to particular recordings made available by MP3.com
unless they have already “purchased” (actually or purportedly), or agreed to purchase, their own CD copies
of those recordings.”)
191

Statement of A.N.P.A. Copyright Committee Regarding Photographic Copyright
Legislation Enacted by the Sixtieth Congress, American Newspaper Publishers
Association [hereinafter ANPA] Bulletin No. 1969, “B” Special. at 1 (March 20, 1909)
(pp.205-207 of 1909 bound volume).
41

not only explicitly protected by the federal copyright statute,192 their publishers had
become successful players in the game, that is, the inter-industry negotiation process that
has accompanied all major 20th Century revisions to the Copyright Act, through which
copyright winners and losers are chosen.193
E.

Copyright Doctrine Today

Most published journalism is treated like any other literary property under
contemporary copyright doctrine, that is, fully protected for the life of the author plus 70
years (or 95 years in the case of corporate authors).194 In theory at least, the “news of the
day” lies outside the scope of copyright protection under the so-called fact-expression
dichotomy,195 and, just as theoretically, news gets more sympathetic treatment under the
fair use doctrine.196 This section will examine today’s copyright doctrine with respect to
journalism and the news, both in the United States and abroad.

1. Fact-Expression Dichotomy
By the 1880s, most courts had recognized that individual newspaper articles and
illustrations generally qualified for copyright protection as literary works,197 although the
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scope of protection in those early cases typically excluded advertisements.198 But the
news contained in the newspaper articles has always remained outside copyright
protection. The invention in 1881 of a telegraphic “ticker,” which printed out news on a
paper tape, gave rise to some of the earlier cases.199 Although many were essentially
appropriation cases,200 the copyright issue was discussed at length in National Telegraph
News Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co.201
Although this, too, is fundamentally an appropriation case, the defendant National
Telegraph argued that the news carried on Western Union’s ticker – including stock
prices, sports scores, and other information – was unprotected against appropriation
unless protected by copyright law.202 If it were the proper subject matter for statutory
copyright (which Western Union had not sought), Western Union’s failure to meet the
deposit requirement would eviscerate any such protection. And if protectable under the
common law, the appearance of the printed tape would constitute publication and
effectively dedicate the news to the public.203

F. 519, 519-20 (S.D. N.Y. 1886) (“The plaintiffs might have copyrighted the cut as an independent subject
of copyright. … So, also, they could have copyrighted each poem or song or editorial composition of their
newspaper.”)
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The court ultimately concluded that National Telegraph had been properly
enjoined from appropriating Western Union’s property, but it rejected any notion that the
ticker reports were protected by copyright law.204 “We are of the opinion that the printed
tape would not be copyrightable,” the court said, “even if the practical difficulties were
out of the way.”205 Acknowledging that the scope of copyright protection had expanded
as new conditions arose, so that nothing is excluded that evinces “the mind of a creator or
originator,” the court nevertheless drew the line “at the point where authorship proper
ends, and mere annals begin.” 206

It would be both inequitable and impracticable to give copyright to every
printed article. Much of current publication – in fact the greater portion –
is nothing beyond the mere notation of events transpiring, which, if
transpiring at all, are accessible by all. It is inconceivable that the
copyright grant of the constitution, and the statutes in pursuance thereof,
were meant to give a monopoly of narrative to him, who, putting the bare
recital of events in print, went through the routine formulae of the
copyright statute.207
The court conceded that the results of a race could be narrated with “creative
imagination” and that market results could form the basis of a useful book or original
article. “But the printed tape under consideration ... is nothing more or less than the
transmission by electricity, over long distances, of what a spectator of the event,
occupying a fortunate position to see or hear, would have communicated by word of
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mouth, to his less fortunate neighbor. It is an exchange merely, over wider area, of
ordinary sightseeing.”208
Finally, the court said, whatever value the tape might have “lasts literally for an
hour, and is in the wastebasket when the hour has passed.”209 It is not the inherent value
of the news that matters to the patron, but the fact that the news reached the patron more
quickly than it would by other means. It is this service that gives the tape its commercial
value, “not Authorship, nor the work of the Publisher.”210
Oh, but what a service! After thoroughly denigrating the value of news as
literature, the court waxes positively poetic about what we take for granted as the
fundamental purpose, value and conceit of today’s electronic journalism:

…that modern enterprise – one of the distinctive achievements of our day
– which, combining the genius and the accumulations of men, with the
forces of electricity, combs the earth’s surface, each day, for what the day
has brought forth, that whatever befalls the sons of men shall come, almost
instantaneously, into the consciousness of mankind. Thus, a gun thunders
in a harbor on the other side of the earth; before its reverberations have
ceased, the moral sequence of the event has taken root in every civilized
quarter of the earth. Famine arises in India to begin its grim march; it has
gotten but little under way until a counter army – the unfailing
benevolence of human kind – has been mustered from America to Russia.
On an isolated island, and without premonition, a mountain claps its black
hands upon the population of a city; almost before a ship in the harbor,
with tidings of the catastrophe, could have set sail, relief ships from the
harbors of Christendom are under way. By such agencies as these, the
world is made to face itself unceasingly in the glass, and is put to those
tests that bring increasing helpfulness and beauty into the heart of our
race.211
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Lest such a service be “outlawed” by denying it the protection of the courts
against the “inroads of the parasite,” the court went on to affirm the lower court’s
injunction against National Telegraph.212 Without such protection, the court said, “but
one result could follow – the gathering and distributing of news, as a business enterprise,
would cease altogether. … The parasite that killed, would itself be killed, and the public
would be left without any service at any price.”213
The reasoning of National Telegraph was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court
sixteen years later in International News Service v. Associated Press, 214 albeit without
the rhetorical flourishes. As in the earlier case, the question before the court was whether
the defendant below could lawfully appropriate for resale news from bulletins issued by
AP or published in AP member newspapers. As in the earlier case, the news was not
protected by copyright, although the product more closely resembled today’s finished
news stories than the ticker tape produced by Western Union.
For tactical reasons, both parties insisted that AP’s material was not subject to
copyright. AP argued that securing copyright for its dispatches was impractical and,
anyway, those dispatches were beyond the scope of the copyright act. Its property
interest lay exclusively in protecting its business from free-riders.215 INS agreed that
AP’s news lacked copyright protection, and like National Telegraph before it, argued that
absent compliance with the formalities of copyright, publication extinguished any
property right in the material. The holding below, that AP and its members retain a
212
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property right in the news until published by each member, is a “mere conclusion,
unsupported by reason.”216
The Court, however, was not taken in by these tactical positions. It recognized
that the Copyright Act was now much broader after 1909 than it was when Clayton v.
Stone217 was decided.

[The act] provides that the works for which copyright may be secured
shall include “all the writings of an author,” and specifically mentions
“periodicals, including newspapers.” [citations omitted] Evidently this
admits to copyright a contribution to a newspaper, notwithstanding that it
may also convey news; and such is the practice of the copyright office, as
the newspapers of the day bear witness.218
Even so, the Court said, the “news element – the information respecting current
events contained in the literary production – is not the creation of the writer, but is a
report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris; it is the history of the day.”219 The
framers, in empowering Congress to enact copyright laws, could not have intended “to
confer upon one who might happen to be the first to report a historic even the exclusive
right for any period to spread the knowledge of it.”220
That would remain the definitive statement of the fact/expression dichotomy as it
relates to news to this day, 221 although the rest of the Court’s tortured reasoning –
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separating AP’s property interest in the news from its commercial interest in making the
news “known to the world” before its competitors, and holding that INS had appropriated
the latter – has been the subject of intense criticism.222 The criticism began implicitly in
the concurring opinion of Justice Holmes223 and explicitly in the dissent of Justice
Brandeis224 – both of which will inform our analysis below. We proceed first to examine
the second copyright doctrine that purports to protect the public interest in news from
monopolization by the media: fair use.

2. Fair Use
The application of fair use doctrine to newspapers goes at least as far back as
Harper v. Shoppell, 225 where the court pointed out that the copyright in a book – here, the

Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright vol. 1 § 2.11 (David Nimmer, rev. author, Matthew
Bender 2003) [hereinafter Nimmer on Copyright]. Specifically, the 1976 Act reads:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. 102(b).
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“book” in question was Harper’s Illustrated Newspaper – is “not always invaded by
reproducing a part of the work.”

Where portions are extracted and published in a book or newspaper by
another, the question whether there has been piracy depends upon the
extent and character of his use of them. Thus it is not piracy for a
reviewer or commentator to make use of portions of a copyrighted work
for the purposes of fair exposition or reasonable criticism. … A test
frequently applied is whether the extracts, as used, are likely to injure the
sales of the original work. [citations omitted]226
But for some of the language omitted here concerning the “appropriation
substantially of the labors of the original author,”227 this 1886 exposition of the fair use
doctrine might well have been used a century later when the Supreme Court, in another
Harper case, gave the fair use doctrine its definitive interpretation. In so doing, the Court
exposed the inadequacy of both the fact-expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine in
protecting the public’s interest in news from the media companies that generate it.
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, Inc.,228 the Supreme
Court denied the protection of the fair use doctrine to a 2,250-word magazine article
concerning President Gerald Ford’s pardon of President Richard Nixon.229 The article
was based on Ford’s still-unpublished memoirs, which had been “leaked” to The Nation
magazine,230 and included 300 to 400 words taken verbatim from the manuscript.231 The
226
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Nation’s article “scooped” a 7,500-word excerpt that Time Magazine was to publish
under license from Ford’s publisher, Harper & Row, and Time reneged on $12,500 of the
$25,000 license fee.232
Unquestionably, the public had an extraordinary interest in the “facts” embodied
in Ford’s memoirs. Had The Nation refrained from using Ford’s actual expression,
Harper would have had no recourse to copyright law for redress.233 Other causes of
action might have been invoked, such as tortious interference with contract, although that
might well have been trumped by the public interest in the information.234
But The Nation argued that the public also had a legitimate interest in Ford’s
actual expression, and, apparently in The Nation’s view, 300-400 words from a booklength manuscript were necessary to vindicate that interest. In particular, The Nation
argued that the public’s interest in hearing Ford’s reasons for pardoning Nixon – in
Ford’s own words – outweighed Ford’s right to control first publication of his memoirs.
“[T]he precise manner in which [Ford] expressed himself [were] as newsworthy as what
he had to say.”235
The Court acknowledged that some of Ford’s expression was “so integral to the
idea expressed as to be inseparable from it,” but found that The Nation used more
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expression than necessary to convey those ideas.236 More importantly, the Court declined
to find what it described as a “public figure exception” to copyright. “Whether verbatim
copying from a public figure’s manuscript in a given case is or is not fair use must be
judged according to the traditional equities of fair use.”237 Accordingly, the Court stepped
through the four prongs of the fair use doctrine.
On the first, “Purpose of the Use,” the Court acknowledged that the article was
“news reporting,” however that might be defined, but found the “crux” of the matter in
whether the magazine stood to profit from the exploiting the copyrighted material without
paying the customary price.238 The Court seemed particularly incensed by the
magazine’s use of a “purloined manuscript” with the intent to “scoop” a competitor who
fairly bid for the rights.239 If “news reporting” is a favored purpose under fair use
analysis, it seemed to weigh very lightly against The Nation’s perceived commercial
interests in publication.
On the second prong, “Nature of the Copyrighted Work,” the Court again
conceded that the memoirs fell into a fair use-favored category, historical narrative or
autobiography.240 But whatever advantage that might have bestowed was quickly
negated. The Court found the fact that a work is unpublished “is a critical element of its
‘nature’” and the “scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works.”241
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The Court added that The Nation’s “clandestine publication…. was hastily patched
together and contained ‘a number of inaccuracies,’”242 but did not say what that had to do
with the nature of the original work.
On the third prong, “Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used,” the Court
was far less concerned with the math than with the “qualitative value of the copied
material.”243 “In view of the expressive value of the excerpts and their key role in he
infringing work, we cannot agree with the Second Circuit that the ‘magazine took a
meager, indeed an infinitesimal amount of Ford’s original language.’”244
Finally, the Court said the fourth prong of the fair use analysis, “Effect on the
Market,” was “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”245 Time’s
refusal to pay the remaining $12,500 under its license agreement gave Harper & Row a
slam dunk. “Rarely will a case of copyright infringement present such clear-cut evidence
of actual damage,” the Court said.246 Even if the economic damage were not so obvious,
“to negate fair use, one need only show that if the challenged use ‘should become
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.’”247
In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court denied a bona fide news magazine the
latitude to use 300 or 400 words written by a President of the United States on a story of
surpassing public importance. One gets the sense that the step-by- step fair use analysis
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was merely an afterthought, that the case was largely decided on the ground that Ford
was deprived of first publication rights, influenced by the unsavory aspects of “leaks” and
“scoops,” and perhaps by the justices’ thoughts about their own memoirs. More
charitably, Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, sees the majority succumbing to the
“temptation to find copyright violation based on a minimal use of literary form in order to
provide compensation for the appropriation of information from a work of history.”248
Joined by Justices White and Marshall, Brennan’s dissent answers the majority
analysis prong for prong and concludes that “the Court’s exceedingly narrow approach to
fair use permits Harper & Row to monopolize information.”249 Quoting Justice
Brandeis’s dissent in INS v. AP, which warned of an “an important extension of property
rights and a corresponding curtailment in the free use of knowledge and of ideas,”250
Brennan went on to offer what he believed to be the essential justification for finding fair
use in this case:

The Court has perhaps advanced the ability of the historian – or at least the
public official who has recently left office – to capture the full economic
value of information in his or her possession. But the Court does so only
by risking the robust debate of public issues that is the ‘essence of selfgovernment.’ The Nation was providing the grist for that robust debate.
The Court imposes liability upon The Nation for no other reason than that
The Nation succeeded in being the first to provide certain information to
the public.251
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Id. at 568 (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
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Id. (quoting INS v. AP, 248 U.S. at 263, Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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That Brennan’s view did not prevail in this case demonstrates the inadequacy of
both the fact-expression dichotomy and fair use, even in combination, to protect the
public’s interest in news. Few litigated examples better represent the “wedding of
expression and idea” than the Ford memoirs,252 and The Nation’s “use” of that expression
was as much a journalistic imperative as a commercial coup. If Brennan’s argument did
not make the case for fair use, then it provides a succinct rationale for removing news
from the stifling embrace of the copyright regime.

Part III –Where shall we go?
In some ways, Harper & Row is the hard case that makes bad law. First
publication rights have a moral foundation beyond the economic underpinnings of
American copyright law.253 President Ford arguably deserved the opportunity to revise
his manuscript or reconsider its release altogether, although nothing of that sort appeared
to be a factor in the case.254 As suggested above, the unpublished nature of the Ford
memoir may well have been the dispositive factor in this case.
Yet, 16 years later, the Supreme Court held that a reporter who broadcast, in
violation of federal law, purloined speech that was never meant to be published was
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See Nimmer on Copyright, supra n. 221, vol. 1, § 1.10[c][2].
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The moral right of publication (droit de divulgation) includes both the right of the author to decide
whether and when the work is to be published and the right to withdraw the work after publication.
Stephen M. Stewart, International Copyright and Neighboring Rights § 4.40, 73 (2d ed., Butterworths
1989) [hereinafter Stewart]. Unlike the other three French moral rights, the right of publication was not
incorporated into the Berne convention. Id. See also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551, nn. 4-5.)
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471 U.S. at 554 (“We also find unpersuasive respondents' argument that fair use may be made of a soonto-be-published manuscript on the ground that the author has demonstrated he has no interest in
nonpublication.”).
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fully protected by the First Amendment because the speech was publicly important. In
Bartnicki v. Vopper,255 the speech in question had little or no commercial value; the
federal statute in question sought to protect a privacy interest, rather than an economic
interest. Otherwise, there is no principled difference between the two cases.256 If Harper
& Row is still good law, then commercial interests outweigh not only the public’s interest
in newsworthy information, but also the personal privacy interests of the speaker.
I have argued elsewhere that the public’s right to newsworthy information ought
to outweigh copyright and suggested any number of mechanisms that might have freed
the Ford memoir. 257 In this piece, however, I am not really concerned about information
of such surpassing public importance. Nor am I interested in exploring further the
peculiar case of unpublished news. Here, my concern is the so-called “ownership” of
published or broadcast news stories – original works of authorship that relate the “news
of the day” to the public.
In my view, such works should be removed entirely from the realm of copyright
protection, and their authors’ interest in them protected by mechanisms that better
safeguard the public’s interest in the widest possible dissemination. Specifically, I would
permit the republication or rebroadcast, by any third party, of any published or broadcast
work commonly understood to be a news story or identified as such by its author after an
embargo of twenty-four hours or, if the regular frequency of the original publication is
255

532 U.S. 514 (2001).

256

One could make the case that, in Bartnicki, the information in question would never have been made
public but for the violation, whereas, in Harper & Row, the public would have received the information
soon enough. Of course, that’s having one’s cake and eating it, too. There is an obvious contradiction in
arguing that one’s first publication rights – including the right to withhold publication – are sacrosanct,
unless one does not intend to publish.
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greater than twenty-four hours, after the next regular issue is published. As noted above,
such an embargo period was contemplated as part of early copyright law. 258
Where the subsequent use is not directly competitive, because the republished
product serves a different purpose or market,259 the embargo period would be deemed
waived. Such republication or rebroadcast would also be subject to the moral rights of
attribution and integrity as defined herein.260 Publishers and broadcasters could bring an
action for unfair competition if the embargo is broken, and reporters and producers could
enforce their moral rights at any time.
By denying copyright protection for news, such a regime would reduce the
incentive for major media companies to treat news stories as commodities valued only for
their propensity to attract readers and viewers who, in turn, can be packaged and sold to
advertisers. The race to the bottom would end. At the same time, this proposal would
protect all of the important interests involved in the news-producing process, including
the public’s right to know, the reporter’s professional reputation, and most of the
publisher’s or broadcaster’s return on investment.
257

Eric B. Easton, Public Importance: Balancing Proprietary Interests and the Right to Know, 21 Cardozo
Arts & Ent. L.J. 139, 184-192 (2003).
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This exception to the embargo recognizes positive value of what has been called a “transformative use”
in the context of fair use analysis. As Judge Leval has said,
To the extent the secondary work merely exhibits the primary copyrighted work, it is
powerfully disfavored by [the “purpose and character of the use”] factor [in fair use
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Moreover, the proposed rule fully comports with international standards.
Legislation embodying the central principles of this proposal is authorized by Article
10bis of the Berne Convention. Specifically, the contemplated acts would allow the
“reproduction by the press, the broadcasting or the communication to the public by wire
of articles published in newspapers or periodicals on current economic, political or
religious topics, and of broadcast works of the same character”261 unless expressly
forbidden by the author. Indeed, the 1948 Brussels text provided for the free use of news
stories unless prohibited by national legislation.262
As in this proposal, the Berne Convention provides that the source must always be
clearly indicated whenever news is reproduced in this way.263 This, Stephen M. Stewart
says, emphasizes the continuing respect for the author’s moral rights (droit moral) even
when economic rights are limited.264 Moral rights may be a largely alien concept in this
country, but this right of attribution (droit de paternité) seemed perfectly appropriate to
Justice Holmes as the solution to International News Service’s appropriation of
Associated Press stories.265 Moreover, it seems entirely compatible with the regard in
which American bylines are held.266
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Berne Convention, supra n. 8, art. 10bis.
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Stewart, supra n. 253, § 5.60(a), 137 (citing the Brussels Act of 1948, art. 9(2)).
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Berne Convention, supra n. 8, art. 10bis.
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Stewart, supra n. 253, § 5.60(e), 137.
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248 U.S. at 248 (Holmes, J., concurring).
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Stewart defines the right of paternity as including “(i) the right to demand that the author’s name appears
in an appropriate place on all copies of the work and to claim authorship of it at all times; (ii) conversely,
the right to prevent all others from claiming authorship of the work; (iii) the right to prevent the use of his
name by someone else in connection with that other person’s work.” Stewart, supra n. 253, § 4.41, 73.
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The byline is something more than merely an acknowledgement of authorship; it
is (or should be) a personal guarantee of good faith from reporter to reader. Byline
“strikes,” where reporters withhold their bylines in protest, often arise during contract
negotiations,267 but may also be used to publicly protest editorial policies or practices
with which the reporters disagree.268
In a section entitled “Employee Integrity,” the Newspaper Guild’s Model
Contract provides that “An employee's byline or credit line shall not be used over the
employee's protest.”269 If reporters hope to win such recognition from their own
publishers, surely no less should be expected from other publishers who use the reporters’
work for free. Under my proposal, use of another news outlet’s story would require
attribution to both the reporter or producer and the publisher or broadcaster.
This provision of the Guild model contract also implicates the moral right of
integrity (droit de respect de l’oeuvre) by requiring that substantive changes in material
submitted shall be brought to the employee's attention before publication. Additionally,
reporters operating under such a contract may “not be required to write, process or
prepare anything for publication in such a way as to distort any facts or to create an

267

See, e.g., A Sun Staff Writer, In Union Action, Baltimore Sun Journalists Withhold Bylines, Balt. Sun
(June 16, 2003) (available in LEXIS, News library, News, All file); Frank Ahrens, 'Byline Strike' Begins at
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suspension of Toledo Blade reporter for parody cartoon); TNG Canada Condemns CanWest Global for
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impression which the employee knows to be false.” 270 Again, I would impose similar
limitations on any subsequent use of the original story.
Three serious concerns with this proposal remain to be discussed: defining
“news,” curtailing “free riders,” and preserving the incentive to produce quality
journalism. We consider each of these in turn.

A. Defining the News
Obviously, the feasibility of this proposal requires a workable definition of
“news.” Resolving that question legislatively comes dangerously close to licensing and
raises unnecessary constitutional issues. Fortunately, “news” is usually defined as such
by those who gather and disseminate it, and when a dispute does occur, the judicial
inquiry need be no more challenging than the fair use analysis judges undertake now.271
The problem of defining news was recently cited by the Federal Communications
Commission in adopting an anti-piracy mechanism for digital broadcast television.272
The FCC’s order requires consumer electronics manufacturers to limit the copies that can
be made of any digital television programming in which broadcasters have inserted some
identifying computer code called a “flag.” The hardware manufacturers and various
other commenters had urged FCC to prohibit use of the flag for news and public interest

270

Id.
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Although the Harper & Row Court endorsed the view that “courts should be chary of deciding what is
and what is not news,” 471 U.S. at 561 (citing Harper & Row Publ. Co. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195,
215 (2d Cir. 1983) (Meskill, J., dissenting)), it did not contradict the Second Circuit’s confident assertion
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F.2d at 206-7.
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programming.273 The FCC agreed instead with the broadcasting and motion picture
industries, which had argued, in part, that the prohibition would implicate FCC overview
of content.274 Although I believe the implication is exaggerated, I am more comfortable

273

Id.

274

Id. Of course, I disagree with the content providers’ other arguments against prohibiting use of the flag
with news and public interest programming, namely, that such programming “merits the same level of
protection afforded to entertainment programming” and “to do otherwise could discourage its creation.” Id.
Rather, I more closely, although not entirely, agree with the dissenting opinions in that case:

I dissent in part, first, because the Commission does not preclude
the use of the flag for news or for content that is already in the public
domain. This means that even broadcasts of government meetings could
be locked behind the flag. Broadcasters are given the right to use the
public’s airwaves in return for serving their communities. The widest
possible dissemination of news and information serves the best interests of
the community. We should therefore be promoting the widest possible
dissemination of news and information consistent, of course, with the
copyright laws. And neither the FCC nor the broadcast flag should
interfere with the free flow of non-copyrightable material. As discussed
above, this Order attempts to strike a balance between preserving
consumers’ reasonable and flexible uses and permitting content providers
a technological means to protect their copyright. But on the scale of the
public interest, we must accord great weight to enabling lawful consumer
and educational use of content when we are talking about something that
goes to the core of America’s public discourse and its civic dialogue. I
understand the arguments of those who caution that precluding the flag for
news and information could entail some difficult and sensitive decisions
about what constitutes news and public information and what does not.
Even if we are confronted with some difficult decisions, I would rather
attempt the difficult than deny the free flow of news and information the
widest possible dissemination.
Id. (Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Approving in Part, Dissenting in Part).
Nor do I take lightly a government-required protection regime that could restrict
the free flow of news or public affairs programming which is at the heart of public
discourse in our society. Our country has a long history of promoting widespread public
access to broadcast television. In return for the free use of the spectrum, broadcasters are
expected to serve their local communities. Consistent with copyright law, the wider the
dissemination of news and public affairs programming, the better our communities and
our democracy are served. The lawful consumer and educational use of content for
scholarship, commentary, criticism, teaching, research, or other socially beneficial
purposes should not be hindered. I see little threat to content creators from a parent emailing to family members and friends a local television news clip of a son or daughter
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leaving that determination to the courts on a case by case basis than to the legislative or
regulatory process.
Certainly, the international copyright regime seems confident that news can be
identified by the courts without too much difficulty. Article 2(8) of the Berne
Convention states that copyright protection “shall not apply to news of the day or to
miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information.”275 Nimmer
suggests out that this language does not prohibit application of copyright protection to
news stories, 276 and American copyright law now protects such stories within the limits
allowed by the fact-expression dichotomy.277 Stewart notes that, under the Berne
Convention, the line between unprotected news and “works” of journalism is to be drawn
by the national courts.278
The problem of defining news may not be as significant as it first appears. Since
the proposed regime would still protect the most important rights associated with true
journalism, a rational media company would only litigate the issue in the unusual case

receiving a community service award, or a teacher choosing to show his or her classroom
a rebroadcast of a space shuttle launch using an Internet connection.
Id. (Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, Approving in Part, Dissenting in Part).
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Stewart, supra n. 253, § 5.55, 135.
The guideline for the courts is the general principle underlying the Convention that to
constitute a work there must be a certain amount of creativity. It is left to the national
courts to decide in each case whether the news item in issue is “merely relating the facts
in a dry and impersonal manner or constitutes a story related with a degree of
originality.” The degree of originality required may vary from country to country.
Where standards of originality are high, e.g., in France, the laws of unfair competition
may give a remedy where copyright does not, e.g., one press agency taking its reports
from another one.
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where a work has substantial economic value over an extended period of time. Such a
work is not likely to be news anyway.
Still, I am prepared to leave the definition largely in the hands of the media
itself.279 That programming that a publisher or broadcaster promotes as news will be
unprotected except as described herein; programming for which traditional copyright is
desired may not be described as news.280 At the very least, a modicum of “truth in
packaging” ought to emerge from this scheme.281

B. Curtailing Free Riders
The notion that “free riding” on someone else’s effort for economic gain is wrong
clearly predates INS v. AP,282 but that case is a good place to begin reexamining the
contention that misappropriation is a significant problem in the news business that
requires control through copyright law. I believe it does not.

Id.
279

I note with interest that Professor Baker has also suggested giving legal weight to media decisions
regarding their own publication choices. In a discussion of confidentiality agreements between reporters
and sources, Baker hypothesizes that common law doctrine could evolve to make such “contracts”
unenforceable where they restrict disclosure of information needed to serve the public interest. “To avoid
content evaluation of the press’s publication decisions, its publication of the information could be taken as
conclusive of whether the public is served.” Baker, supra n. 65 at 60.
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And, in the case of broadcast programs involving political candidates, may not qualify as an exception
under Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act, 42 U.S.C. 315(a) (2000). Thus, a broadcaster
would have the option of enforcing copyright for its political programming or providing equal on-air
opportunities to opposing candidates. Either way, the public would benefit.
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I do not think this approach requires a return to the copyright notice abandoned by the 1976 act in
conformance with Berne requirements. I am content to let the courts adjudicate the adequacy of notice
through context one case at a time. There may be some difficulty at the margins, but hard news should be
readily identifiable for the most part.
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Judge Grosscup’s colorful opinion in Natl. Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 296
(7th Cir. 1902), compares the act of appropriating and reselling another’s wire service reports to that of a
parasite ultimately destroying its host and leaving the public without any news service at all.
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Let us first consider what appears to be the principal rationale of INS v. AP: free
riding constitutes unjust enrichment of the pirate at the expense of the entrepreneur.

[T]his defendant… admits that it is taking material that has been acquired
by complainant as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor,
skill, and money, and which is salable by complainant for money, and that
defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own is endeavoring to
reap where it has not sown…. 283
Enrichment, yes. But unjust? We all derive some cost-free benefit from the
labor, skill, and money of others. Sir Isaac Newton famously stood “on the shoulders of
giants” to see the scientific truths he discovered,284 and I got 23 free minutes at a parking
meter today on someone else’s quarter. We react viscerally against anyone (else) getting
“something for nothing,” yet we have declined to protect facts, or even compilations of
facts that required labor, skill, and money to produce, from appropriation.285 To be sure,
copyright law protects original expression from appropriation, but not to prevent unjust
enrichment. If that were the motive behind copyright law, the Supreme Court would not
have rejected the “sweat of the brow” doctrine.286
So, if free riding is a problem, it must be a function of unfair competition. That
is, the problem exists when – and only when – the republisher’s use of the original
expression hurts the original publisher’s business out of all proportion to the republisher’s

283

248 U.S. at 239.
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Generally attributed to Newton’s letter to Robert Hooke, dated Feb. 5, 1676, based on an aphorism from
Robert Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy: “Pygmies placed on the shoulders of giants see more than
the giants themselves.” Burton's source is said to be the 12th Century scholastic Bernard de Chartres, who
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Cosmic Baseball Association, http://www.cosmicbaseball.com/newton8.html (updated Nov. 24, 2003). See
also Myers, supra n. 222, at 681.
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Id. at 359-60.

63

investment or risk or creativity. Put another way, where the republisher’s use has no
adverse effect on the publisher’s business – as when the uses are not directly competitive
– free riding should not be an issue. One example might be websites that post copies of
newspaper articles and solicits comments from their members. 287 Even where there is an
adverse effect, it may be justified by the value added by republication. Examples of such
uses might include the video monitoring or “clipping” services that tape and may sell
copies of broadcast news stories that feature their clients,288 or websites containing
searchable databases of news stories from across the globe.289
The only realistic adverse effect of these examples might be an unfair competitive
advantage for the republisher if, but only if, the original producer wanted to enter the
same business. Copyright law now recognizes the holder’s proprietary interest in
prospective markets for her copyright material,290 but one may question whether that
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recognition is appropriate for news. As long as sufficient incentive remains to ensure that
the news is gathered in the first place, there is no reason to reduce competition in the
dissemination of news and every reason to encourage it. We return to the question of
incentive shortly.
Before that, however, we must consider the case where the competition is direct
and potentially damaging to the original producer, such as the cost-free, risk-free
republication of wire service stories without attribution or added value that actually
occurred in INS v. AP.291 The result, of course, was the Supreme Court’s endorsement of
the misappropriation tort in such circumstances. While the immediate application of the
tort may have been reasonable, it was certainly poor public policy.
Criticism of the misappropriation tort abounds,292 and it has effectively been
eliminated from the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.293 Perhaps the most
telling came from Justice Brandeis’s dissent in INSv. AP itself:

291

This characterization of the situation in INS v. AP reflects the majority view in that case and, perhaps
because that view prevailed, the conventional wisdom today. In retrospect, Justice Brandeis, not
surprisingly, may have had the clearer view. Brandeis found nothing anticompetitive in INS’s taking:
The acts here complained of were not done for the purpose of injuring the business of the
Associated Press. Their purpose was not even to divert its trade, or to put it at a
disadvantage by lessening defendant’s necessary expenses. The purpose was merely to
supply subscribers o the International news Service promptly with all available news. …
Furthermore, the protection to these Associated Press members [afforded by the
injunction] consists merely in denying to other papers the right to use, as news,
information which, by authority of all concerned, had theretofore been given to the public
by some of those who joined in gathering it; and to which the law denies the attributes of
property.
248 U.S. at 261 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions –
knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas – become, after
voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use. Upon
these incorporeal productions, the attribute of property is continued after
such communication only in certain classes of cases where public policy
has seemed to demand it.294
And that determination, Brandeis believed, should only be made through
legislation.295 Of course, bringing news stories under copyright law would have solved
that problem, whatever Brandeis’s views on its propriety. Now, however, copyright and
related laws have become nearly as restrictive as misappropriation. In particular, the
unholy combination of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act296 and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft297 now allows copyright owners to seal works away from
the public utterly and forever.298
As noted above, this proposal would remove news stories from copyright
protection, but would not restore an unbounded misappropriation tort. Rather, the
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http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/comments/Init018.pdf (visited Feb. 9,
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proposal would permit a sharply curtailed tort claim only where the republisher directly
competes with the original producer – that is, non-transformative uses – and temporary
embargos are broken. Tort claims would also be available for violating the moral right of
attribution – as Justice Holmes advocated in his concurring opinion in INS v. AP299 – or
the moral right of integrity.300 The remaining question is whether these very limited legal
rights are sufficient to preserve the incentive to produce high quality journalism.

C. Preserving Quality Journalism
Underlying all copyright law is the idea of incentive. The constitutional language
authorizing Congress to grant this limited monopoly to authors in their writings declares
that its purpose is to “To promote the Progress of Science,”301 i.e., knowledge, and the
Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the profit motive to the overall
copyright scheme.302 It is certainly appropriate to ask what incentive news organizations
will have to gather and disseminate news in the absence of copyright protection.
Of course, as soon as the question is asked, the answer becomes obvious. News
stories have only been subject to copyright for the last century or so, but news has been
gathered and disseminated for millennia. Mitchell Stephens tells us our “urge to tell” the
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news is deeply engrained in our collective psyche.303 “[M]ost of the world’s peoples
have given away the news they have stumbled upon without charge. … Even where news
dissemination becomes a profession, those professionals have found that they can obtain
their raw material – fresh information – from their sources without financial charge.”304

Unlike food, shelter or clothing, most news has value only in the
telling; it is worthless when wrapped in silence. And news spoils too
quickly to allow it to be squirreled away for future use….
Not that we bother to calculate the perishability or economic utility
of some choice bit of news before we share it or wait for a nudge from
social pressure to spread the news we have collected. We give news as we
receive it – eagerly. We are, most of us, free and enthusiastic newstellers.305
Stephens goes on to explain that the “act of telling news brings with it a series of
ego gratifications: the opportunity to appear well informed, knowledgeable, current…;
the chance to capture attention, to perform and win appreciation; and the privilege of
branding events with one’s own conclusions.”306 He finds that news-tellers’ own
perceptions and experiences are enhanced by sharing them, which bestows the power to
invest those events witnessed or experienced with validity and importance, “events with
the stature of news.”307

News, then, is both pulled and pushed through our society…: the
uninformed anxious to obtain news, the informed eager to give it away.
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Even without benefit of sophisticated information technologies, the news,
driven by these complementary desires, can obtain impressive speeds.”308
But the argument can be made that this natural inclination to gather and
disseminate news will have little impact in the modern world, where a significant amount
of capital is required to reach a mass audience – even through the Internet – and the
absence of copyright protection and, therefore, the prospect of future returns, is hardly
conducive to investment. One could imagine the General Electrics and Disneys pulling
out of the news business altogether, leaving us to rely on Internet “blogs” or even more
primitive equivalents for our news.
This rather bleak view is predicated at least two questionable assumptions. First,
that all major media corporations place the bottom line ahead of their civic
responsibilities as journalists. While that might be true of a General Electric or Disney, it
is much harder to imagine the New York Times or Associated Press “pulling out of the
news business” under any conceivable copyright or non-copyright regime. Whatever
revenues the print media may receive from their copyrights, or whatever losses might be
incurred by the absence of copyright, surely constitute a tiny fraction of their overall
revenue and an even smaller portion of their incentive to publish.
The second assumption is that the departure of these media giants from the news
business would mean a corresponding loss of quality journalism. As discussed in Part I,
one might well take issue with the proposition that we’re getting quality journalism now
from their involvement. As Baker points out, media firms “cannot adequately capture
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the positive benefits of investigative journalism” and will therefore “disproportionately
underproduce the most valuable investigative material.”309
Baker uses the example of evening news programs to suggest that the public may
receive “only marginally more benefits from a number of virtually identical products”
produced a great expense than it does from a single product produced far more
cheaply.310 “For example, both NBC and ABC evening news might cost roughly the
same to produce, but if the programs are sufficiently similar, the public might receive
virtually the same value, an evening news program, whether or not the second exists.”311
In short, any concern that depriving the media industry of copyright protection for
hard news will deprive the public of quality journalism is probably unfounded, or at least,
exaggerated. Indeed, I believe this proposal would result in a reinvigorated journalism,
one that features a much greater role for the independent journalist, and a somewhat
lesser role for the profit-motivated media company.
Incorporation of Guild contract language into my proposal reflects my view that
strengthening the bond between reporter and audience, even at the expense of the
employer-employee relationship, is a healthy step in the right direction.312 I am not
prepared to advocate Baker’s most radical suggestion, the enactment of a law permitting
journalists to elect their own editors, thus insulating them from owners’ profit-motivated
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interference,313 but I am sympathetic to the development of a cadre of reporters and
editors whose first allegiance is to their professional standards, rather than the bottomline orientation of ownership.314
In the final analysis, the production of quality journalism will depend on
individual reporters and editors. The law, especially copyright law, can only nudge the
media industry in one direction or another. I am under no illusion that this modest
proposal will ever be adopted by Congress. But someday, somewhere, some enlightened
newspaper publisher just might dedicate all news stories to the public and challenge other
publishers to do the same. Then, and only then, will the public really own what Philip
Graham called the “first rough draft of history.”315
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